Archived decisions

Contact: Alan Mills, ext 6930

1. Summary

1.1 This report reviews the provision of safety fences on bridges over railways in light of the recently published reports by the Highways Agency (HA) and the Health and Safety Commission (HSC), following the Selby train crash. It also covers parapets on these bridges, the majority of which are not to current vehicle containment standards.

1.2 The report concentrates on County Council and Railtrack owned bridges carrying roads over railways and other lengths of county highway adjacent to railways.

1.3 Key issues are identified and recommendations on the way forward are given.

1.4 Bridges over or under motorways and trunk roads are not examined in detail, as they are the HA's responsibility.

2. Background

2.1 In the early hours of 28 February 2001 a vehicle and trailer left the nearside of the M62 motorway at the Little Heck Bridge, near Great Heck, Selby, Yorkshire. The vehicle and trailer ended up on the east coast main railway line, where it collided with, and derailed, a high speed passenger train, which in turn impacted with an oncoming heavy freight train. Ten people died in this tragic accident.

2.2 Immediately after the accident, the Deputy Prime Minister commissioned the HA to review standards for the provision of nearside safety fences on major roads.

2.3 Speaking in the House of Commons on 12 March 2002, Keith Hill, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (now the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions [DTLR]) said "The Deputy Prime Minister has asked the HSC to convene and lead a working group that will look at the circumstances of incidents where vehicles have blocked rail lines and whether there are features in common that might have been preventable. In parallel, the Highways Agency will be reviewing its standards for safety barriers".

2.4 In a subsequent statement to the House on 8 May, Keith Hill said that "the reports of both groups will be presented to the Deputy Prime Minister in the autumn" (now to the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions).

2.5 Both groups submitted their respective reports to the Secretary of State towards the end of last year and their findings were published on 25 February this year. The process of prosecuting the driver prevented the earlier publication of the reports.

3. The Highways Agency Working Group

3.1 The terms of reference of this working group, which also have relevance for highway authorities such as Hampshire County Council, are:

"To review the standards for the provision of nearside safety barriers on major roads in the light of recent accidents and make recommendations to the Highways Agency".

3.2 The group included representatives from highway administrations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, professional institutions and rail operators. The HA commissioned TRL Limited as consultants to assist the group with its study. The group included Alan Mills, the Assistant County Surveyor.

3.3 The group agreed that its scope of work should be to:

(i) Identify and consider UK research and studies related to the protection from hazards of errant vehicles leaving the nearside of major roads.

(ii) Consider options for change by assessing quantifiable risks, costs and benefits, and the implications for non-trunk roads.

(iii) Identify and consider the practice and standards for the provision of safety barriers in countries where circumstances are similar to the UK.

(iv) Consider the cost and practicality of implementation on new and existing roads.

3.4 The working group concluded that the risk of a serious accident arising from a vehicle leaving a major road and reaching a railway line was extremely low, but that further steps could be taken to continue efforts to reduce accidents and injuries on Britain's major roads. It also found that there were no serious shortcomings in the existing safety barrier standards and their application to the nearside of the major roads, but that road designers would benefit from a more detailed explanation of the derivation of the advice. Minor roads, ie county roads, however were acknowledged as having more potential problems. The report recommended a clearer, more open procedure for updating the standards relating to safety barriers and the incorporation of the latest UK research and international experience. A revised safety barrier standard will be issued later this year.

3.5 A risk assessment methodology for road/rail interfaces will shortly be produced by the HA, in partnership with Railtrack, for the motorway and trunk road network. This will build on the risk framework being prepared for local authority roads under the auspices of the CSS (formerly the County Surveyors' Society). These frameworks enable the relevant authorities to identify high risk sites and prioritise any work that needs to be carried out to ensure consistent practice, and that mitigation measures are appropriate. It was a recommendation that the DTLR take the lead in bringing together the interested parties to prepare advice on appropriate mitigation measures for application on minor roads crossing rail lines.

3.6 This study focuses on major roads which were defined as motorways, dual and single carriageway trunk roads and dual carriageway principal roads, thus picking up nationally and regionally strategic roads where the speed limit was likely to be 50 miles per hour or more. The potential problem of all other minor roads crossing over railway lines is acknowledged, but not specifically addressed, and because the report's conclusions are equally relevant for these minor roads, the implications for highway authorities such as Hampshire County Council could be serious and involve costly mitigation measures. It is probable that this issue could feature as a high corporate risk and will require an action plan of control measures.

4. The Health and Safety Commission Report

4.1 This working group was asked to look into the problem of vehicles obstructing railway lines, following the incident at Great Heck. Its conclusions were:

(i) Current initiatives to develop a comprehensive risk assessment tool to make it possible to access, on a consistent basis, the risks at locations where railways and roads intersect or run close to each other, should be taken forward.

(ii) A thorough risk assessment of all locations should be carried out; a quick `first pass' to filter out lower risk locations; comprehensive assessment of the remainder and action to be completed where needed, within two years at the latest.

(iii) A protocol should be developed to ensure no misunderstandings arise as to the responsibilities of the respective road/rail authorities.

4.2 The last point above is particularly relevant for minor road crossings, as it is unclear where the duties, responsibilities and ownership lie between Railtrack and local highway authorities on the approaches to bridges owned by the former.

5. Implications

5.1 Given the situation described, it was clearly both prudent and necessary for the County Council to take stock of the position in Hampshire, with respect to the relevant road/rail bridge crossings. Therefore a preliminary risk assessment exercise was undertaken on all these bridges.

5.2 The majority of bridges carrying county roads have no approach or trailing safety fences and have substandard parapets. There are three main reasons for this:

(i) vehicle containment standards were not introduced until 1967;

(ii) containment standards, especially for bridges over railways, have since been increased; and

(iii) some pre-1994 parapets are substandard due to a manufacturer's design fault.

5.3 Other lengths of county roads adjacent to hazards, particularly railways, also have non-existent or substandard containment.

5.4 Post Selby, public and political awareness and attention has focused on bridges over railways and, together with other roads adjacent to railways, these are generally assessed as highest risk for causing a major incident.

5.5 County Council and Railtrack owned bridges carrying roads over railways have had initial risk assessments and other sites adjacent to railways have been identified but not yet assessed.

5.6 This report is therefore the preliminary, and to some extent pre-emptive, step in implementing recommendations in the HA's and HSC's reports.

5.7 It is difficult at this stage to estimate the likely cost of funding remedial works which may be required to improve the safety of these bridges, but it could quite easily amount to several million pounds. The Government has remained silent with respect to providing additional funding and therefore it must be assumed that appropriate bids will have to be made through the Local Transport Plan (LTP) process, and this in turn will have implications for other areas of the budget and other competing priorities. For example, if monies were to be diverted from Highways Maintenance, then meeting the PSA commitment could be in jeopardy.

6. Proposed Action

6.1 Prioritisation and initial risk assessment to be completed for all vulnerable railway locations where roads and railways intersect or run close to each other, in accordance with the methodology being produced by the DTLR, so as to identify the highest risk sites.

6.2 Comprehensive risk assessment and feasibility studies for protective measures for the highest risk sites to be carried out, in accordance with the HSC report. It is possible in some circumstances that the provision of safety fences is not a suitable or practical solution and some form of speed reduction measure would be more appropriate, for example shuttle working traffic signals over the bridge.

6.3 A protocol with Railtrack for responsibility and ownership of parapets, safety fences and protective measures for Railtrack-owned bridges carrying county roads to be established.

6.4 Extra funding to be sought from Central Government, via the Government Office for the South East, through the Annual Progress Report of the LTP to be submitted in July 2002. There are indications that no further funding will be available; in which case it will be necessary to review overall spending priorities within the LTP settlement.

6.5 A further report to be prepared once the actions in paragraphs 6.1 to 6.3 are completed.

Recommendation

That the proposed actions, as set out in paragraph 6, be supported.

7160/AABM