Hampshire County Council Executive Member - Environment 14 January 2003 Consultation Paper from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: Review of the Planning Enforcement System in England Report of the Director of Environment

Item 2

Contact: Roger Stow, ext 6731

1. Summary

1.1 The following decisions are sought:

That the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister be:

(i) thanked for the opportunity to comment on the consultation paper `Review of the Planning Enforcement System in England';

(ii) advised, for the reasons set out in the attached report, that:

(a) the decision whether or not to take enforcement action should remain at the discretion of the local planning authority;

(b) criminalisation would normally be an inappropriate and disproportionate response to breaches of planning control, except where there are persistent and deliberate breaches, where planning authorities should have reserve powers to immediately instigate a prosecution;

(c) retrospective planning applications continue to have a role to play in legitimising unauthorised development against which enforcement action is inappropriate; and

(d) resourcing planning enforcement presents a barrier to its effectiveness and there is a need to raise the profile of planning enforcement, and for local authorities and Government to accord it higher priority.


(iii) sent the answers to the questions raised in the consultation paper as set out in the attached appendix; and

(iv) advised of the County Council's concern about the late submission of planning applications for variation of condition to allow extensions of time for temporary permissions, thus prejudicing proper consideration of the merits of continuation of development beyond the period granted. Such an application should be required to be submitted six months before expiry of the temporary permission or the permission would lapse and a new full application would be required, subject to the discretion of the local planning authority in consideration of the particular circumstances pertaining.

2. Reason

2.1 In September 2002 the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) published a consultation paper `Review of the Planning Enforcement System in England' which reviews the existing planning enforcement system and invites comments on a number of detailed questions and issues.

2.2 A report to the Regulatory Committee on 27 November 2002, attached as an appendix, set out proposals for responding to that consultation. Members supported the recommendations in the report, subject to two amendments, that:

(i)double fees should be charged for retrospective applications (Recommendation (ii)(c)); and

(ii)an application for variation of condition to allow extensions of time for temporary permissions should be required to be submitted six months before expiry of the temporary permission or the permission would lapse and a new full application would be required (Recommendation (iv)).

2.3 The ODPM's view is that higher fees for retrospective planning applications would be counter-productive, acting as a further disincentive to applying, and that the ability to apply retrospectively does not in itself encourage unauthorised development. The counter-view is also posed that the higher fee would not be a penalty, rather a way to help recover the local authority's costs of considering enforcement action; and that it would act as an incentive for applying for planning permission before works commence. The response to this issue in the report (appendix, question 6) is that, whilst higher fees might help local planning authorities to recover costs, they would be likely to be seen as a penalty by developers and third parties alike; a further disincentive and counter-productive. On balance, however, it is considered recommendation (ii)(c) should not be amended to include a request for double fees to be charged for retrospective applications.

2.4 The suggested amendment to item (iv) reflects the concerns of the Regulatory Committee that temporary planning permissions were sometimes being abused. Temporary planning permissions are granted either to assess the impact of an operation to determine whether a permanent permission would be acceptable or to enable development such as mineral extraction or landfill to be undertaken within an agreed timescale. It is legitimate for developers to seek a permanent or further temporary permission to enable operations to continue or to be completed. Provided such an application is submitted before the time limit expires it can be dealt with as a variation of condition. If it is submitted after the expiry date a new permission is required. This amendment is supported in principle, but would require a legislative change. However, minerals and waste development can be cyclical, being dependent on such matters as market forces and weather conditions. It may not always be feasible to assess six months in advance whether for example extraction or landfill can be completed to enable restoration to take place. In such cases a lesser or greater period may be more appropriate. However, the appropriate period would be for the regulators to determine.

3. Other Options Considered and Rejected

3.1 Not to offer a response. Rejected because of the importance of such powers to enable the County Council to enforce against breaches of planning control.

4. Conflicts of Interest Declared by the Decision Maker or a Member or Officer consulted - None.

5. Dispensation granted by the Standards Committee - Not applicable.

6. Reason(s) for the Matter being dealt with if Urgent - Not applicable.

Approved by: Date:

Councillor K B Estlin

Section 100 D - Local Government Act 1972 - background papers
The following documents disclose facts or matters on which this report, or an important part of it, is based and has been relied upon to a material extent in the preparation of this report.
NB the list excludes:
1.	Published works.
2.	Documents which disclose exempt or confidential information as defined ]in the Act.

TITLE	LOCATION
None

7652/RS

APPENDIX

Hampshire County Council Regulatory Committee 27 November 2002 Review of the Planning Enforcement System in England Report of the Chief Planning Adviser to the Regulatory Committee

Item 16

Contact: Roger Stow, ext 6731

1. Summary

1.1 In September 2002 the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) published a consultation paper `Review of the Planning Enforcement System in England' which reviews the existing planning enforcement system and invites comments on a number of detailed questions and issues. This report sets out proposals for responding to that consultation. A summary of the questions to which comments are invited in the Review and the responses are given in the attached appendix.

2. Background

2.1 The Planning Green Paper `Planning - delivering a fundamental change', published by the former Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions in December 2001, announced that the current enforcement arrangements would be reviewed. The Green Paper set the ambitious task of delivering a fundamental change in the planning system. For development control generally, the measures proposed are essentially about making the system work better, being more responsive and more transparent. The outcome of the Green Paper consultation `Sustainable Communities: Delivering through Planning', published by ODPM in July 2002, set out a comprehensive package of reforms to deliver a step-change in the operation of the planning system to make it faster, fairer and more predictable.

2.2 The Green Paper makes it clear that effective enforcement is central to ensuring that public confidence in the planning system is not undermined. The consultation paper has two objectives:

(i) to gather information on the way planning enforcement is currently undertaken and the outcomes it achieves; what is wrong with the enforcement system and what can be done to make it work better; and

(ii) to seek views on a range of possible changes to the current system which might improve its speed and effectiveness.

2.3 The Green Paper says that the current system is complex and cumbersome, and difficult and expensive for local planning authorities (LPAs) to operate. Particular issues mentioned include looking again at the case for making breaches a criminal offence; increasing penalties so that they are more of a deterrent; and reviewing the arrangements whereby people can effectively buy extra time to enjoy the benefit of unauthorised development by appealing against an enforcement notice to the Secretary of State.

2.4 The current arrangements for enforcement are embedded in primary legislation, the Planning and Compensation Act 1991, supported by Planning Policy Guidance Note 18 (PPG18) 'Enforcing Planning Control' 1991, and Circular 10/97 'Enforcing Planning Control: Legislative Provisions and Procedural Requirements'. Any major changes would require legislation. The consultation paper also considers how much could be done to improve things through secondary legislation or by administrative action, such as guidance and better resourcing of enforcement by local authorities.

2.5 In the meantime, new rules and targets for handling enforcement appeals are to be put in place in December 2002, building on the experience of changes made to the rules for planning appeals introduced in August 2000 and targets set for the Planning Inspectorate.

3. Fundamental Principles of Planning Enforcement

3.1 The enforcement of planning control rests on three fundamental principles:

(i) the use of enforcement powers is discretionary;

(ii) developing without planning consent or in breach of a consent which has been granted is not an offence; and

(iii) planning permission may be sought retrospectively.

Removal of discretionary duty

3.2 Discretionary powers provide LPAs with the flexibility to tailor the enforcement to fit the nature and circumstances of the breach or alleged breach. Minor breaches can often be resolved informally through negotiation and persuasion; more complex cases, or where there is a clear and deliberate abuse of the system, may require more formal action. The alternative view is that discretion leads to inconsistencies both within and between authorities; removes certainty; and undermines confidence in the system. However, there is a risk that the system would fall into disrepute if all breaches of planning control were prosecuted no matter how trivial. This approach would impact on large numbers of householders and businesses and would place an intolerable burden on LPAs, the Planning Inspectorate and the Courts. Other authorities, such as the Police and Environment Agency, have discretion whether to prosecute and it can be argued that democratically elected local authorities should be able to exercise similar judgement.

Criminalising breaches of planning control

3.3 Developing without planning consent or in breach of a consent which has been granted is not an offence. The proposition in the Green Paper is that unauthorised development should be an immediate offence, punishable regardless of whether permission is subsequently granted or of the steps taken to remedy it. Such an approach would clarify uncertainty, sending a clear message that such development would not be tolerated; would provide a means to tackle short-lived breaches effectively; and provide a strong deterrent. However, the margins between lawful and unlawful development are not always clear-cut. Under the present arrangements, the onus is on the appellant/offender to prove, on the balance of probability, that there has been no breach because what is alleged has not taken place or is lawful. Criminalisation would shift the burden of proof to the LPA which would need to prove `beyond reasonable doubt' that a breach had occurred. Given the complex nature of the planning system, and reliance on the planning history of a site, this could lead to less effective enforcement and undermine confidence. Also, without significant caveats, committing a trivial and unwitting breach could lead to a criminal record. A Magistrates Court may not be a suitable forum to argue the finer technicalities of planning legislation and would be overburdened with caseload.

Retrospective Planning Permission

3.4 Advice in PPG18 is that while it is unsatisfactory for anyone to carry out development without first obtaining planning permission, enforcement action should not be taken solely to `regularise' development which would otherwise be acceptable on its planning merits. Retrospective planning applications provide a means through which to legitimise unauthorised development against which enforcement action would be inappropriate. Whilst this may be seen as a means of pre-empting a decision, statistical evidence shows that the `success rate' of such applications is lower than for applications submitted in advance of development. All such applications should be determined on their merits, with the usual opportunities for third party representations and the opportunity to attach conditions. LPAs' scarce resources should be focused on significant breaches, not on retrospective development which would be given permission. The Review says LPAs are best placed to decide whether development is unauthorised; whether to seek retrospective applications or take enforcement action.

4. Resources and a Proactive Approach

4.1 The Review refers to the perception that LPAs do not always take prompt enforcement action; that problems tackled at the start may be resolved through negotiation without the need to resort to formal, and costly, enforcement procedures at a later stage; but that even an informal approach requires resources. LPAs' ability to act swiftly to remedy breaches is often hampered by lack of resources and by other priorities. Enforcement is rarely seen as a priority function. The ODPM acknowledges that the enforcement function is resource hungry and does not benefit from a distinct income stream. Planning application fees were increased by 14% for 2002/03 and the Green Paper promised a fundamental review of the operation, scope and coverage of the fee regime, including enforcement and the monitoring of conditions. The ODPM also announced in July 2002 that a new planning delivery grant would be in place from 2003/04 to improve the performance of LPA services, possibly to include performance on enforcement. Enforcement by LPAs is largely a reactive process but where LPAs are proactive enforcement works better. However, this is not simply a matter of finance and priorities. The availability of suitably trained and experienced staff is part of a much bigger picture identified in the Green Paper to improve recruitment to the planning profession and ensure staff have the necessary skills through proper training and education.

5. Enforcement Powers

5.1 LPAs currently have a range of enforcement powers at their disposal. These are designed to enable action to be taken which is appropriate to the particular breach. The ODPM believes that the range of enforcement powers currently available gives LPAs the right tools to be able to effectively enforce planning control. However, the Review welcomes views on whether all the powers available are necessary or whether more are needed.

6. Officer's Comments

6.1 The County Council adopted a `Planning (Enforcement) Policy' in 2000 which provides the framework for the planned monitoring and enforcement of over 200 permitted minerals and waste development sites in the county and for responding to complaints received about these sites and other, unauthorised operations. This work is undertaken by a dedicated team within the Minerals and Waste Planning Group of the Environment Department. The team also services Liaison Panels associated with many of these sites; processes the submission of details required under specific planning conditions; and undertakes all other statistical monitoring associated with minerals and waste planning applications, reviews and policy, and publishes an Annual Report.

6.2 The ODPM recognises that monitoring and enforcement of planning permissions is `resource hungry'. This is particularly true of minerals and waste development where planning permissions are invariably complex; development is undertaken over many years and, in the case of mineral operations, may lawfully be permitted over 60 years; generate considerable local concerns; and can involve some operators who use the enforcement procedures to their advantage.

6.3 The benefits of a proactive approach to monitoring and enforcement and the procedures for undertaking these are recognised. However, the success or otherwise of enforcement action, whether formal or informal, is frequently down to the cooperation of the operator. Where the operator does not cooperate, resources are diverted from programmed monitoring and can then lead to other breaches going unrecorded.

6.4 Whether or not to take enforcement action should be based on an assessment of risk to the environment and allocation of resources. Removing discretionary powers would place an unacceptable burden on LPAs, and remove such powers of judgement from democratically elected bodies. Therefore the decision whether or not to take enforcement action should remain at the discretion of the LPA.

6.5 Similarly, criminalisation should not remove the discretion of LPAs to balance resources against risk to the environment and serve enforcement notices where appropriate. Otherwise, the burden of proof would be transferred from the developer to the LPA, involving detailed casework in each and every breach no matter what the impact. There is merit in making persistent and deliberate breaches of planning control a criminal offence, but the use of prosecution procedures would need to be subject to clear and unambiguous guidelines set down. Otherwise, LPAs would be open to frequent challenge by third parties every time they determined not to pursue a particular case. Therefore, criminalisation of enforcement would be appropriate but restricted as a reserve power for persistent and deliberate breaches of planning control.

6.6 The ability to determine retrospective planning applications enables LPAs to regularise breaches of planning control, which would otherwise be acceptable in planning terms, without the need for enforcement action. Retrospective applications enable LPAs to impose conditions so as to control such development. Otherwise, breaches of planning control would be regularised through enforcement action which would be open to appeal and loss of democratic control. Therefore, retrospective planning applications continue to have a role to play in legitimising unauthorised development against which enforcement action is inappropriate.

6.7 The ODPM recognises that monitoring and enforcement are `resource hungry', not only in financial and priority terms but in recruitment and skills training. In recent years, identifying and recruiting suitably experienced staff to undertake monitoring and enforcement in minerals and waste planning has proved difficult. Whilst Hampshire County Council is committed to proactive enforcement, resources are limited and fine judgments on priorities have to be made in resource terms, as well as on the merits of cases. Removing the discretionary powers of LPAs can only exacerbate the situation, diverting planning and legal resources from other priorities. If LPAs are to be given greater powers, and if the public expects stricter enforcement, then the County Council will need to review its enforcement policy and the resources committed to it. Resources do present a barrier to effective enforcement which is essential to effective planning and are in need of a higher priority by all levels of Government.

7. Conclusions

7.1 The Consultation Paper raises a number of detailed questions and issues upon which responses are requested, in addition to those addressed above. The County Council can only enforce against matters within its competence. District Councils have the powers to enforce most development, including the County Council's own development. The questions, and responses in relation to enforcement of `county matter' development, predominantly minerals and waste, are set out in the attached appendix.

7.2 The enforcement system needs improving to be a flexible but effective deterrent against deliberate abuse of the system. Pursuing minor breaches through the Courts would only discredit LPAs in the eyes of the public, as well as overloading the system. However, powers should be available to LPAs to deal with persistent and deliberate breaches of control by speedy prosecution through the Courts, to cut short the enforcement 'loop holes' open to developers which buy extra time to enjoy the benefits of unauthorised development. Likewise, the definitions of `permitted development' and `wastes' also need reviewing, especially with regard to `agricultural improvement' and other exempt means of disposing of waste under planning control, to close other abuses.

7.3 Members have also expressed concern about the late submission of planning applications for variation of condition to seek extensions of time for temporary permissions. Late applications are believed to prejudice the proper consideration of the merits of continuation of development beyond the period previously granted. This can be overcome by writing to applicants reminding them why a temporary permission was granted in the first place and the need to submit an application in good time before the permission expires. However, such an approach will not be successful in every case and the ODPM should be advised of Members' concerns and their wish that such behaviour be penalised.

Recommendation

That the Executive Member for Environment be advised that the Regulatory Committee considers that the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister be:

(i) thanked for the opportunity to comment on the consultation paper `Review of the Planning Enforcement System in England';

(ii) advised, for the reasons set out in the report above, that:

(a) the decision whether or not to take enforcement action should remain at the discretion of the local planning authority;

(b) criminalisation would normally be an inappropriate and disproportionate response to breaches of planning control, except where there are persistent and deliberate breaches, where planning authorities should have reserve powers to immediately instigate a prosecution;

(c) retrospective planning applications continue to have a role to play in legitimising unauthorised development against which enforcement action is inappropriate;

(d) resourcing planning enforcement presents a barrier to its effectiveness and there is a need to raise the profile of planning enforcement, and for local authorities and Government to accord it higher priority;

(iii) sent the answers to the questions raised in the consultation paper as set out in the attached appendix; and

(iv) advised of the County Council's concern about the late submission of planning applications for variation of condition to allow extensions of time for temporary permissions, thus prejudicing proper consideration of the merits of continuation of development beyond the period granted.

Section 100 D - Local Government Act 1972 - background papers
The following documents disclose facts or matters on which this report, or an important part of it, is based and has been relied upon to a material extent in the preparation of this report.
NB the list excludes:
1.	Published works.
2.	Documents which disclose exempt or confidential information as defined in the Act.

TITLE	LOCATION
None

7559/RS

APPENDIX

REVIEW OF THE PLANNING ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM IN ENGLAND - CONSULTATION PAPER

Summary of questions/issues on which views are invited by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) and response of Hampshire County Council

The County Council is responsible for the enforcement of `county matter' developments, predominantly minerals and waste. Therefore, the following responses are made predominantly in relation to those responsibilities. The summary of the questions/issues on which views are invited by the ODPM in `quotes' is followed by the County Council's response in italics.

1. `We feel that it is important that the decision whether or not to take enforcement action remains at the discretion of the local planning authority. But there are arguments for and against.'

See Main Report paragraphs 6.1 to 6.4 and recommendation (ii)(a).

2. `We would be grateful for views, from local authorities in particular, on resourcing planning enforcement and whether this presents a barrier to its effectiveness. Is identifying and retaining suitable staff to undertake enforcement work a problem? Is there a need to raise the profile of planning enforcement and for local authorities to accord it a higher priority?'

See Main Report paragraph 6.7 and recommendation (ii)(d).

3. `The Government believes that criminalisation would be an inappropriate and disproportionate response. Criminalisation seems too draconian a penalty given the minor and often unwitting nature of the vast majority of breaches of planning control.'

See Main Report paragraph 6.5 and recommendation (ii)(b).

4. `We believe that retrospective applications continue to have a role to play in legitimising unauthorised development against which enforcement action is inappropriate.'

See Main Report paragraph 6.6 and recommendation (ii)(c).

5. `Where a retrospective application is not submitted, should the LPA be able to require a fee to be paid with non-payment being an offence?'

Where the LPA invites the developer to submit an application it will have taken a view that permission is required; the development is not contrary to policy; and is not damaging to amenity, otherwise enforcement action would be considered. If enforcement action were not taken and such a fee were required and paid then presumably a `deemed consent' would also apply. This could be a seen as a cheap option to applying for planning permission and counter-productive.

6. `We believe that higher fees for retrospective planning applications would be counter-productive, acting as a further disincentive to applying. The ability to apply retrospectively does not in itself encourage unauthorised development.'

Whilst higher fees might help LPAs to recover costs, they would be likely to be seen as a penalty by developers and third parties alike; a further disincentive and counter-productive.

7. `We believe that the range of enforcement powers currently available gives local authorities the right tools to be able to effectively enforce planning control. However we would welcome views on whether all the powers available are necessary, or indeed whether more are needed.'

The range of enforcement powers available is necessary and on balance reasonable. However, see Main Report paragraph 7.2.

8. `We do not believe that local planning authorities are reluctant to take enforcement action because of the risks of failure, but we would welcome authorities' views on this.'

LPAs have to balance the costs of enforcement against a likely outcome. Waste Planning Authorities' experience is that even where action is upheld, the developer is rarely required to undertake full reinstatement and so benefits from having undertaken the development without permission.

9. `Why is the use of formal enforcement powers declining and do steps need to be taken to regain public confidence in the system?'

LPAs' resources are limited and formal enforcement has to be balanced against other commitments to development control and policy performance. The introduction and use of Planning Contravention Notices (PCNs) (and injunctions) have reinforced the tools available to LPAs and perhaps deterred further breaches.

10. `We would welcome views on the usefulness of the existing Good Practice Guide and any suggestions for amendments or additions.'

The Good Practice Guide should be updated in the light of the reviews of the enforcement system and fees regime; charges in the handling of enforcement appeals; and the introduction of the new planning delivery grant and performance targets.

11. `Does the risk of compensation liability act as a deterrent to the use of stop notices?'

Clearly the risk has to be balanced against the potential harm to amenity, the likely cost and outcome, and the benefits of taking such action.

12. `Should provision be made in legislation to enable a stop notice to be issued at the start of unauthorised development and before an enforcement notice is served?'

The serving of a stop notice, independent of an enforcement notice, before or once unauthorised development takes place would be of considerable benefit. If this could be followed by a short period, say 48 hours or longer by agreement, to allow for negotiation without compensation, this would be useful to both parties and increase public confidence. However, clarification and/or simplification of permitted development rights would be an essential corollary of this approach.

13. `We do not see any need to introduce a right of appeal against a breach of condition notice.'

Adequate mechanisms exist for varying planning conditions. Introducing a right of appeal would only add another route for delaying compliance with conditions.

14. `Views are sought on the practicalities of introducing and operating a requirement to have a notice on the site indicating when the work commenced. Should there be a sanction for failing to display such a notice? A possible alternative would be a requirement for the developer to notify the planning department when works are about to commence.'

The role of the local community in monitoring development is recognised. A mechanism for notifying the LPA of commencement is necessary and can be done through conditions; this to be copied to the parish or town council or local association. The proliferation of a clutter of site notices is to be avoided but the appropriate developer and regulatory contacts could be incorporated into a site notice board as required under waste management licences. It would not be practicable to display planning conditions where these are varied and numerous and relate to detailed plans and particulars.

15. `Would a self-certification process to confirm that a development accords with the planning permission be workable?'

Self-certification, with the caveats suggested, would be welcomed. In the case of ongoing development, such as mineral extraction and waste disposal, this should be on an annual basis. However, self-certification is no substitute for monitoring, particularly with respect to public perception and confidence.

16. `Should the provisions of the planning contravention notice be extended to provide for power to require the submission of a planning application?'

Since the PCN is a diagnostic tool, it would be unreasonable to `require' the submission of a planning application without the benefit of the information sought in it. However, the provisions could be amended to `invite' the submission of an application as one of the options for compliance where it is clear that an application has some prospect of success.

17. `We invite views on the abolition of the 10 year rule and on whether there should be a transitional period, of say 3 years, before abolition of the ten year limit to give time for obtaining lawful development certificates for all existing development which did not have planning permission.'

There is merit in having a mechanism for controlling deliberate concealment or intensification. As in the case of minerals and waste development, modern planning and licensing conditions are now applied retrospectively. However, the impact of abolition on businesses and local authority resources should be fully assessed before taking such action.

18. `We invite views on the practicalities of serving enforcement notices soon after retrospective planning permission is refused.'

Any measures to bring unauthorised development under control without delay are appropriate. A recommendation for refusal of a retrospective application should be accompanied by a consecutive one for enforcement action to avoid uncertainty consequential upon appeal. However, the LPA is able to delay enforcement where the applicant is believed to be taking reasonable steps to rectify the breach by whatever means.

19. `Should local authorities have the right to decline to determine applications for lawful development certificates or planning permission once an enforcement notice has been served which relates to that development?'

The developer, through a PCN or letter, is given due warning of enforcement action. Unless an application for lawful development is made within the warning period, or such time as may be agreed with the LPA, the determination should be through the appeal process.

20. `We consider that the right of appeal against an enforcement notice should remain in its current form.'

Human rights and natural justice should be balanced against speeding up the process. However, the rights of the appellant should not override those of third parties affected by the development. The appellant should be prevented from exacerbating any alleged harm to the environment pending the resolution of the appeal.

21. `We believe that all the grounds of appeal should remain in their current form. (If the ten-year rule was to be abolished (paragraph 17 above) an amendment to ground (d) would be required).'

The grounds of appeal should remain for the reasons set out in paragraph 5.39.

22. `Should the whole of the `double deemed fee' go to the local planning authority to help pay towards the cost of enforcement? Local authorities would be expected to take on the responsibility for administering the administration fee system, including initial calculation of the deemed application fee.'

In view of the apparent cost and absence of benefit to the Inspectorate, the fee should be payable to the LPA.

23. `We invite views on the practicalities of authorities joining forces to identify cases which have reached a similar stage and which can be brought to Court together.'

Since minerals and waste enforcement case numbers are relatively small and referral to court is infrequent, joint action is unlikely to be practicable.

24. `We invite views on the merits and practicalities of skills sharing and joint working between authorities on enforcement cases, and on sharing legal representation'.

The benefits of skills sharing and joint working are acknowledged in appropriate cases.

25. `Is there a need for more or better guidance for Magistrates?'

There is merit in such cases being referred to Magistrates with the necessary knowledge and/or experience, and for better guidance for Magistrates.

26. `Is the level of fines which Magistrates are able to impose adequate? Should local authorities more frequently invite Magistrates to decline jurisdiction in cases where the fine is likely to be more than £20,000 so that these cases would instead be heard in the Crown Courts where a higher fine can be imposed?'

Experience indicates that Magistrates are taking breaches of waste licensing brought by the Environment Agency more seriously. However, this authority has no recent experience of bringing cases to Court, so no view is expressed.

27. `Is deferment a real problem and might bundling cases together for hearing reduce the scope for deferment?'

With no direct experience of deferment, no opinion is expressed.

28. `Views are invited on the suggestion that when local planning authorities are seeking an injunction in order to establish "harm" the judge should be invited to visit the appeal site to see first hand the exact nature and effects of the breach of planning control.'

The logic of this is sound in certain cases, particularly once an interlocutory injunction has been granted. However, this authority has no recent experience of seeking an injunction.

29. `Would a formal mediation process for enforcement result in quicker and more effective resolution of breaches of planning control?'

In this authority the use of mediation in development control between the applicant and objectors has proved expensive and ultimately unsuccessful, in spite of the best efforts of the applicant. Whilst it could be useful in minor cases, the complex technical nature of minerals and waste development suggests the informal hearing process as a more appropriate means of `mediation' in the enforcement process.