Contact: Tony Clatworthy, ext 01489 576387

email : [email protected]

1. Summary

1.1 The developer, Hamble Yacht Services Limited, has applied to Eastleigh Borough Council, the Marine Consents and Environment Unit, English Nature and the Environment Agency for the necessary consents for the development and extension of the pontooning and piling at Hamble Yacht Services Limited at Hamble, Port Hamble Marina.

1.2 The River Hamble Harbour Authority has been consulted and asked to comment on matters of navigational safety by the agencies referred to above. As part of the Harbour Authority's statutory duties it has to grant consent permitting harbour works in the navigation of the River Hamble, including works to modernise, extend and relocate pontoons. This consent is in addition to the planning permission required.

1.3 This is a resubmission following modification of the original proposals. The report recommends that consent be granted, subject to a number of conditions.

2. Details

2.1 Consent may be granted by the Harbour Authority permitting harbour works in the navigation of the River Hamble to accord with the Southampton Harbour Act 1924 and 1949, as amended by the River Hamble Harbour Revision Orders 1969 to 1989. Within the Harbour Authority's statutory duties lie the responsibilities to ensure that all matters concerning navigational safety are addressed. This area of responsibility includes the area known as the Main Navigation Channel and other secondary and mooring channels in that location.

2.2 Hamble Yacht Services Limited, which operates from Port Hamble Marina on the western shore of the river, is one of the leading service providers to the performance yachting sector in the UK. Hamble Yacht Services Limited is an independent company, which over the last eight years has progressed with a plan to refurbish the buildings in order to make the company a centre of excellence in boat repair and maintenance. Boats ranging from 34 foot to 80 foot are constructed and commissioned in the yard. Hamble Yacht Services Limited also acts as the UK agents for Swan Nautor and therefore requires permanent dedicated berthing for yachts up to 80 feet, together with suitable electricity supplies and other services to enable the yachts to be serviced efficiently.

2.3 Hamble Yacht Services Limited is an important local employer with a permanent staff of around 75 people, employing all the marine trades and fully supporting an apprentice scheme which continues to train youths in marine industry skills. Other small businesses located in and around the yard employ a further 100 people who largely rely on Hamble Yacht Services Limited to provide the customer base.

2.4 The applicant's proposed development would allow the yard to continue building and servicing large ocean-going yachts and support the international and national fleet of off-shore racing yachts from the Solent and Europe. The proposed development will move the yard's working berths out into the river and displace a number of Crown Estate moorings. These moorings will be moved to a new pontoon further upstream from their present location. The new pontoon for the displaced moorings will also help remove a number of fore and aft moorings that tend to swing out into the main fairway, reducing the main channel and therefore causing a danger.

2.5 The plans were first brought to the Executive Member's Decision Day on 26 July 2004. At that meeting various concerns where identified and the Harbour Master highlighted the risk to small tenders being forced out into the main channel and meeting traffic coming head on. As the only concern was the risk to small tenders, managing that risk was investigated and the provision of a bridge to allow small tenders to navigate and transit through the area was suggested as a solution to the problem.

2.6 The applicant was asked to investigate the possibility of the inclusion of a bridge and a route for tenders through the marina into a new plan. Should the new scheme satisfy concerns highlighted in the risk assessment, the Director of Environment would be able to grant consent for the revised proposals. The Harbour Master was to facilitate this procedure. The Harbour Master presented the revised scheme to interested parties but Hamble River Sailing Club have opposed the revised plans on several grounds, as set out in paragraph 3.8. The Harbour Master then brought the revised plan before the River Hamble Executive Member's Group for consideration on 25 October. At that meeting all Members were in agreement that a bridge for tenders, useable at all states of the tide, incorporated into the marina plans would overcome the safety issues for tenders highlighted in previous risk assessments.

3. Effects of the Development on Navigational Safety

3.1 The following points have been noted by the Harbour Master regarding navigational safety and are highlighted from the Risk Assessment attached to this report. These points were brought to the attention of the River Hamble Executive Member's Group on 26 July 2004, along with the engineering drawings of the proposed development numbered 2328-P-100 and again on 25 October with the following drawings: Bridge Arrangement SOL-1724-SC03-000 dated 30 September 2004; Proposed Arrangement SOL-1724-SC02-000 dated 30 September 2004; and Existing Arrangement SOL-1724-SC01-000 dated 30 September 2004.

3.2 The Harbour Authority held a consultation process with all stakeholders before producing the original risk assessment. The original development proposal indicated a number of concerns that could not be managed safely, therefore the Harbour Master proposed a reduced development and produced a risk assessment for those proposals at the Executive Member for Environment meeting on 26 July 2004. The risk assessment attached to this report covers the new revised plans from the developer and indicates that all identified risks can be managed safely.

3.3 The installation of the Boatscrubber pontoon on pile HP15 to HP16 on the eastern side of the river will introduce a small amount of traffic to that area. This is not thought to be significant. This traffic will not alter significantly from the present visiting vessels that use the moorings. It will also reduce the amount of space that was taken up by four to five boats that rafted out at this location (visitors' piles).

3.4 The main fairway will be 70 metres wide at its upstream end, which is 10 metres wider than when the G piles were in place. The downstream end of the proposed pontooning will be over the location of the displaced G Piles, making the main channel 60 metres wide at that point.

3.5 The XODs departing and arriving back at their pontoon between F1 and F4 may have difficulties as they are not fitted with engines and rely purely on the wind for propulsion. This can be a difficult departure and approach in low winds and strong tides. The proposed entry and exit gap will now allow the XODs direct access to their mooring pontoon. The proposed layout will therefore benefit the XODs.

3.6 The proposed new pontoon will replace the current fore and aft moorings and will run for 24 metres. This pontoon will accommodate the displaced vessels from G20 to G25 public moorings. The replacing of the fore and aft moorings, which are double berths for vessels up to 35 feet, will halt the problems experienced during strong tides and winds. These moorings are forced out into the main channel in a westerly wind and into the mooring/access channel in a easterly wind. The replacement of these moorings will be a benefit to navigational safety and halt the reduction of the main channel width of up to 10 to 12 metres during westerly winds.

3.7 The gap between the new pontoon and the pontoon at F5 to F7, which forms the access channel, will be fixed at 17.33 metres and will no longer be affected by the movement of the fore and aft moorings.

3.8 The main objections in allowing the proposed scheme to proceed with a bridge provided for tenders are as follows:

OBJECTION	PROPOSED OFFICER RESPONSE
(i) The aperture of the bridge is very narrow and will not allow two small dinghies to pass.	The lateral depth of the bridge will be less than three metres and therefore a passing situation will not arise.
(ii) An oarsman with 8.1 (sic) metre oars would have difficulty in passing through a three metre gap.	One pull and then ship oars will allow the tender under oars to glide through the bridge.
(iii) Mooring pontoons and vessels would obstruct passage of tenders.	The channel will be kept clear at all times and will be policed by the Harbour Authority. The yard has also confirmed that the channel will remain free at all times to allow tenders to proceed.
(iv) The clearance under the bridge will not allow a tender to pass through without the helm bending double.	The seat height of a tender is unlikely to be more than 0.5 metres above the water and a man sitting would be approximately one metre high. The proposed bridge gives 1.5 metres clearance, which is sufficient.
(v) The design height makes no allowance for action in an emergency.	The proposed bridge is less than three metres in lateral depth and a tender would complete passage through such a bridge very quickly. The bridge is in a working marina and if difficulties arose it would have the option to come alongside or call for assistance.
(vi) The bridge will not allow sailing dinghies to pass through.	Correct. They would use the main channel or the secondary channel on the eastern shore as they currently do.
(vii) The bridge, because of the clearance, would not allow the passage of small craft to transit through the bridge.	The bridge is designed for tenders and other small craft such as canoes should they whish to use the facility. Other small craft such as RIBs would use the main channel as they always have done in the past.
OBJECTION	PROPOSED OFFICER RESPONSE
(viii) The closure of the access route because of the proposed development, with a bridge that may obstruct or, by design of insufficient clearance, risks trapping dinghies and small craft that have proceeded to the bridge through the channel. In effect the bridge creates a blind channel without an escape route.	A sign giving warning of the clearance will be displayed at the entrance to the channel. Should tenders get into difficulties they may come alongside in the marina or call for assistance.
(ix) The proposed development obstructs a secondary channel.	It is worth noting that the Harbour Master classes the westerly route along the outside of Port Hamble as dangerous for small tenders. Vessels departing from Port Hamble suddenly appear and proceed into the main channel at speed. Even harbour patrol launches have difficulties with inexperienced skippers suddenly appearing, charging into the main channel. Vessels waiting or approaching the fuel berth are also a danger to small vessels with a low freeboard. The Harbour Master recommends using the eastern side of the river for passage of small tenders.

Recommendation

That, under Section 10 of the Southampton Harbour Act 1924 and Section 48 of the Southampton Harbour Act 1949, as amended by the River Hamble Harbour Revision Orders 1969 to 1986, conditional consent be granted to Hamble Yacht Services Limited for harbour works in the navigation of the River Hamble, permitting Hamble Yacht Services Limited to modernise, extend and relocate its pontooning at Hamble Yacht Services Limited, as shown on the drawings supplied by Solent Marine Limited and displayed at the River Hamble Executive Member's Group at Warsash on 25 October 2004:

Bridge Arrangement SOL-1724-SC03-000 dated 30 September 2004;

Proposed Arrangement SOL-1724-SC02-000 dated 30 September 2004; and

Existing Arrangement SOL-1724-SC01-000 dated 30 September 2004

(the overall drawing showing all relevant moorings will be displayed at the meeting - Drawing No 2328/P/100 dated 1 November 2004)

and subject to the following conditions:

(i) no dredging to be involved;

(ii) the proposed new berths only to be used as working berths. A working berth is defined as a berth used to accommodate a vessel during building or repair;

(iii) that passage through the bridge designed for tenders be available at all states of the tide and access to this channel not to be blocked by moored vessels in the marina berths. The access route to the bridge to have a four metre channel available to allow tenders to route through the marina at all times. The bridge, to allow tenders to pass through, must not be less than three metres wide and not less than 1.5 metres high. The bridge to be lit within, to enable those using it to identify the location;

(iv) Hamble Yacht Services to meet the cost of erecting signs on the piles at the entrance to the tender channel warning of the bridge clearance available;

(v) Hamble Yacht Services Limited to meet the cost of establishing and maintaining a solar powered navigation light on the downstream pontoon pile and also to paint the pile in high visibility red paint (initial painting on installation);

(vi) Hamble Yacht Services Limited to establish and maintain two vertical fixed red navigation lights on the upstream outermost pile/pontoon and paint the pile with high visibility red paint (initial painting on installation);

(vii) at no time is Hamble Yacht Services Limited to allow double berthing to take place on the outside face of the proposed jetty head; and

(viii) all other appropriate consents being obtained.

9071/TC



RIVER HAMBLE HARBOUR AUTHORITY

PORT MARINE SAFETY CODE

RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

NAVIGATION CHANNEL

ADJACENT

HAMBLE YACHT SERVICES

AND

ALTERATIONS TO G PILES

26 July 2004

1. INTRODUCTION

The Government looks to all Harbour Authorities to implement the requirements of the Port Marine Safety Code (The Code). The Code is intended to apply to all Harbour Authorities to the extent that they have duties and powers relating to marine safety.

It is particularly directed at Harbour Authorities and to Directors, Commissioners or Trustees who are members of the boards of such Harbour Authorities. The Code is not optional it applies to ports of all sizes, irrespective of resources or levels of traffic.

The Code represents the national standard against which policies, procedures and performance of Harbour Authorities may be measured. It is obligatory for the purpose of meeting the standard in the Code that measures are taken to reduce all risks associated with port marine operations to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).

1. SCOPE

The Code does not apply to duties and powers other than those related to marine operations. Marine operations are those that facilitate the safe use of a harbours by vessels. They include the direction of shipping and the regulation of safety of navigation in a harbour and the maintenance of aids to navigation within the jurisdiction of a harbour.

2. RISK ASSESSMENT

The Code requires that each Harbour Authority assess risks associated with marine operations and manages those risks to reduce them to As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP). Risk assessment is an ongoing process to this end the risk assessment has been carried out by the Harbour Master to consider the risks associated with the proposed development at Stone Pier Yard.

3. DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this report the following definitions will apply:

A hazard is anything that can cause harm to a person, property or the environment;

A risk is the chance, high or low, that a person, property or the environment will be harmed by the hazard.

4. METHODOLOGY

To assess risks in The River Hamble 4 steps are followed:

1. Hazards are identified;

2. The consequence of the hazard materialised are assessed;

3. The risk and existing precautions are evaluated;

4. The findings are recorded.

It is also recognised that provision must be made to review and revise this assessment as necessary.

The aim of the risk assessment is to ensure that all of the significant hazards (potential accidents) associated with marine operations are identified and quantified in terms of risk to people, property and/or the environment.

This information provides an essential input to the continual development of The River Hamble Harbour Authority Safety Management System and will be used by the Harbour Authority as a rational basis on which to decide priorities and to set objectives for eliminating hazards and or reducing risks to As Low As Reasonably Practical.

The risk assessment identifies each hazard and then categorises them as either a collision, contact, grounding or a swamping hazard:

Collision:

Collision between two or more vessels which are underway, regardless of whether the vessel(s) are not under command or disabled in any way but excluding wrecks.

Contact:

A vessel striking, or being struck by, an external object or a vessel that is not underway (e.g. anchored or moored), excluding the sea bed.

Grounding:

A vessel coming to rest on, or riding across, underwater features or objects.

Swamping:

The excessive ingress of water over the gunwale of a vessel such that it becomes waterlogged and may sink.

An estimated degree of risk is assigned to each identified hazard to provide a relative rating between risks. The following scoring system has been applied:

LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE

CONSEQUENCE

Each hazard has been assigned a score of 1 to 5 for the "likelihood of occurrence" and a score of 1 to 5 for "consequence". The "risk rating" has then been obtained by multiplying the two scores together giving a maximum rating of 25. The higher the rating the more serious the potential consequences. Rating risks help to give an indication of their significance.

As a guide it is considered that any "risk rating" of 12 and above, is not ALARP and therefore additional precautions should be implemented to ensure compliance with the Code.

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF HAMBLE YACHT SERVICES

5. RESULT OF RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT

Of the 15 identified hazards 1 obtained risk ratings that would indicate that it would not at present be ALARP.

The following table lists precautions that would be introduced to manage the identified risks and therefore reducing the Highest Risk Rating to ALARP. These precautions reduce the risk to the figures denoted within the ( )

Precautions:

Control of entrance or departure to the River of all commercial craft. Commercial vessel deemed a danger will not be allowed entrance during periods of heavy volumes of traffic.

If necessary an escort will be given by the harbour patrol vessel.

The River Hamble Safety Management System will be amended to address these hazards so that identified risks will be managed to be as low as reasonably practical.

Full consideration will be given to the precautions identified above, reducing the Highest Risk Rating to below 12.

Precautions to be introduced:

(i) Harbour Authority to control the entrance or departure to the River of all commercial or large craft. Commercial and large vessel deemed a danger will not be allowed entrance during periods of heavy volumes of traffic. If necessary an escort will be given by the harbour patrol vessel.

(ii) Continue to educate those that use tenders and small dinghies to wear buoyancy aids or life jackets. To also carry torch and bailers etc.

(iii) To continue to make masters of larger vessels aware of the safety implications of travelling to fast and to ensure a good lookout is kept at all times by all masters and crews.

(iv) By using signage and other methods, attempt to make masters of vessels departing marinas reduce speed and to keep a good lookout for dinghies and small tenders.

6. CONCLUSION AND HARBOUR MASTER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The risk assessment indicates that the proposed development will not result in the creation of any risks that are not considered to be As Low As Reasonably Practical and therefore all risks can be managed and reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical, this accords with the Port Marine Safety Code.

Having carefully considered this risk assessment the Harbour Master recommends that the proposed development at Hamble Yacht Services will not adversely effect navigational safety.

6.1 The Harbour Masters also makes the following recommendations and comments;

(i) Hamble Yacht Services to establish a solar powered navigation light on the down stream outer pile and also paint the pile with high visibility red paint.

(ii) Hamble Yacht Services to establish two vertical fixed red lights at the upstream outer pontoon and also paint the pile with high visibility red paint.

(iii) Hamble Yacht services to design the ends of the pontoons, and pile guides to be rounded and fixed with fendering.

(iv) The XOD fleet, in the main, is sailed by dedicated and experienced sailors who understand the risks and manage those risk successfully every week when sailing in the River. Even so, because the River is changing and the type of vessel and those that operate them are changing, a new mooring location should be investigated. Ideally any new location should afford the same shelter and give easy and direct access to the entrance of the River. Negotiations between the Crown Estates and the XOD fleet should be encouraged by the Harbour Authority.

(v) Even though the bridge is being supplied to allow tenders to transit the proposed new working berths within Hamble Yacht Services the Harbour Master would recommend the following:

(1) Those in small craft such as tenders would be recommended not to transit the River on the western side owing to the dangers of proceeding around the fuel berth and the seven blind exits from Port Hamble Marina. A small craft such as a tender with low freeboard will be difficult to see from a craft exiting the marina and would be liable for swamping or collision.

(2) Rowing boats would be safer to proceed on the eastern side of the River as this is deemed a safer route by the Harbour Master for the reasons given above and the tidal strength on the eastern side is weaker at this point of the River.

(3) The Harbour Master would recommend to all who use tenders to wear lifejackets and to carry aboard the recommended safety equipment for dinghies and tenders.

7. ONGOING RISK ASSESSMENTS

The assessments of risks is an ongoing process. This risk assessment will be regularly reviewed and updated and/or amended as appropriate. New risks that emerge as conditions or the use of the harbour change will be given immediate attention.

Risk assessment and the management of risks is a continual process.

AG Clatworthy

Harbour Master

26 October 2004