Contact: Tony Clatworthy, ext 01489 576387

email: [email protected]

1. Summary

1.1 The River Hamble Harbour Authority has been consulted and asked to comment on matters of navigational safety by the agencies referred to above. As part of the Harbour Authority's statutory duties it has to grant consent permitting harbour works in the navigation of the River Hamble, including works to modernise, extend and relocate pontoons. This consent is in addition to the planning permission required.

1.2 This is a re-submission following modification of the original proposals. This report recommends that consent be granted, subject to a number of conditions.

2. Details

2.1 Consent may be granted by the Harbour Authority permitting harbour works in the navigation of the River Hamble to accord with the Southampton Harbour Act 1924 and 1949, as amended by the River Hamble Harbour Revision Orders 1969 to 1989. Within the Harbour Authority's statutory duties lies the responsibility to ensure that all matters concerning navigational safety are addressed. This area of responsibility includes the area known as the Main Navigation Channel and other secondary and mooring channels in that location.

2.2 The proposed development will move the yard's working berths out into the river and displace a number of Crown Estate moorings. These moorings will be moved to a new pontoon further upstream from their present location. The new pontoon for the displaced moorings will also help remove a number of fore and aft moorings that tend to swing out into the main fairway, reducing the main channel and thereby causing a hazard to navigation.

3. Effects of the Development on Navigational Safety

3.1 The following points have been noted by the Harbour Master regarding navigational safety and are highlighted in the Risk Assessment attached to this report. These points were brought to the attention of the River Hamble Executive Member's Group on 26 July 2004, along with the engineering drawings of the proposed development numbered 2328-P-100, and again on 25 October with the following drawings: Bridge Arrangement SOL-1724-SC03-000 dated 30 September 2004; Proposed Arrangement SOL-1724-SC02-000 dated 30 September 2004; and Existing Arrangement SOL-1724-SC01-000 dated 30 September 2004.

3.2 The main fairway would be 70 metres wide at its upstream end, which would be 10 metres wider than with the G piles in place. The downstream end of the proposed pontooning would be directly over the location of the displaced G Piles, making the main channel 60 metres wide at that point.

3.3 The XODs departing and arriving back at their pontoon between F1 and F4 sometimes experience difficulties with the current situation as they are not fitted with engines and rely purely on the wind for propulsion. This can be a difficult departure and approach in low winds and strong tides. The proposed enlargement of the entry and exit gaps would allow the XODs direct access to their mooring pontoon. The proposed layout would therefore benefit the XODs and would be an improvement to safety.

3.4 The proposed new pontoon upstream above G27 would replace the current fore and aft moorings and would run for 132 metres. This pontoon would accommodate the displaced vessels from G20 to G25 public moorings. The replacing of the fore and aft moorings, which are double berths for vessels up to 35 feet, would overcome the problems experienced during strong tides and winds. At present, these moorings are forced out into the main channel in a westerly wind and into the mooring/access channel in an easterly wind. The replacement of these moorings would be a benefit to navigational safety and overcome the narrowing of the main channel width by as much as 10 to 12 metres during westerly winds.

3.5 The gap between the new pontoon and the pontoon at F5 to F7, which forms the access channel, would be fixed at 17.33 metres and would no longer be affected by the movement of the fore and aft moorings.

4. Hamble Yacht Services Limited Impact Assessment

4.1 The following is an impact assessment and a consolidation of the important points brought to the Harbour Master's attention by various groups during the consents process, along with explanations and in some cases recommendations by the Harbour Master to ensure navigational safety.

Impact on the Width of the Main Channel

4.2 The width of the main channel would not be altered in any way apart from increasing the width by ten metres at the upstream end of the proposed extension. The removal of the mooring piles from G20 to G24 would provide the extra width to the channel.

4.3 The installation of a pontoon on the eastern side of the river for the boat scrubber (immediately opposite Hamble Yacht Services Limited) would reduce the number of boats moored at that location to one only. At present, there could be up to four boats abreast on the visitors piles at that location.

4.4 The maximum beam of boats that would use the proposed outside berths at Hamble Yacht Services Limited is six metres (a Swan 82), including fendering. With a typical three metre boat width on the eastern side of the river there would be a main channel of between 51 and 61 metres. A 50 metre channel is safe at that location and would be exactly the same as at present, after taking into account the presence of moored vessels.

4.5 Removing the fore and aft moorings above G27 and installing a pontoon to relocate the displaced moorings would also improve navigational safety. Currently, vessels on the fore and aft moorings can be forced out into the main channel (in the prevailing westerly wind) or can be blown towards the shallower moorings reducing the manoeuvring space between them in an easterly wind. The movement of vessels on these moorings can be as much as 10 to 12 metres laterally. This does depend on the state of the tide and the wind direction. The movement of these vessels also effects the space available for vessels to manoeuvre through the gaps to reach their moorings. This is important for the XOD fleet.

Access and Egress for Other River Users

4.6 The proposed development would improve access to F pontoon for the XOD fleet by widening the available gap from the main channel, allowing them to sail directly onto the pontoon at two locations (from downstream and upstream of F pontoon) when returning to their moorings. These gaps are from the proposed outer upstream end of the Hamble Yacht Services Limited pontoon to G25 (a gap of 45 metres) and the gap between G27 and the downstream end of the proposed new G pontoon (a gap of 22 metres). These extended gaps would allow the XOD fleet and other vessels under sail or power to join the main channel safely.

4.7 Vessels proceeding downstream from inshore moorings and joining the flow of outbound traffic on the starboard side of the channel would have the full 45 metres gap available, which would allow them to join the flow of traffic at a shallow angle (in accordance with the Collision Regulations) and in complete safety.

Impact on Secondary/Access Channels

4.8 Should the development proceed, the secondary channel from upstream of G27 will be protected and will not be reduced by the movement of the fore and aft moorings.

Impact on Tenders Using the Proposed Tender Bridge

4.9 The proposed bridge has been designed to allow small tenders to use it and this is reflected in its dimensions: not less than 1.5 metres high and not less than 3 metres wide. The thwart height of a tender is unlikely to be more than 0.5 metres above the waterline and a man sitting would be approximately one metre above this. The proposed bridge gives 1.5 metres clearance, which is sufficient.

4.10 The bridge would be available at all states of the tide and a clear defined route would always be available which would be enforced by the harbour patrols and the Harbour Master.

4.11 The lateral depth of the bridge would only be three metres therefore a passing situation is unlikely to arise. The bridge would be part of a working marina complex and if difficulties arose tenders would have the option to come alongside or call for assistance.

4.12 A sign giving warning of clearance would be displayed at the entrance to the tender channel. Should tenders get into difficulties they may come alongside a yacht or pontoon or call for assistance. The route through the pontoon complex would be four metres wide at its narrowest and considerably wider than this where it passes the bow and stern of moored yachts. These wider points would provide adequate passing places for tenders and small craft .

4.13 The use of the bridge for tenders would be a much safer option than the present arrangement as tenders would no longer need to proceed into the main channel with its associated traffic, and they would be able to route upstream and return in an area of the river with less tidal stream.

Access and Egress for Vessels Using the Hamble Yacht Services Facilities

4.14 Vessels departing from the facility and using the proposed upstream Hamble Yacht Services Limited gap would also have the 45 metre gap available, which would give them excellent visibility of vessels moving down stream before moving into the main channel at a shallow angle.

4.15 Vessels entering the marina upstream to take up berths would have more room to manoeuvre than previously, making the approach safer. Inbound vessels would inevitably have to turn to cross the channel, into the path of outgoing traffic, as they do at present.

4.16 Vessels departing from Hamble Yacht Services Limited downstream exit would be protected by the proposed development and would be able to join the traffic flow at a shallow angle and every bit as safely as they do now.

Recommendation

That, under Section 10 of the Southampton Harbour Act 1924 and Section 48 of the Southampton Harbour Act 1949, as amended by the River Hamble Harbour Revision Orders 1969 to 1989, conditional consent be granted to Hamble Yacht Services Limited for harbour works in the navigation of the River Hamble, permitting Hamble Yacht Services Limited to extend the working berths G Pile moorings at Hamble Yacht Services Limited, as shown on the drawings supplied by Solent Marine Limited:

(i) Bridge Arrangement SOL-1724-SC03-000 dated 30 September 2004;

(ii) Proposed Arrangement SOL-1724-SC02-000 dated 30 September 2004;

(iii) Existing Arrangement SOL-1724-SC01-000 dated 30 September 2004; and

(iv) Drawing No. 2328/P/100 dated 1 November 2004;

and subject to the following conditions:

(i) No dredging to be involved;

(ii) That passage through the bridge designed for tenders be available at all states of the tide and access to this channel not to be blocked by moored vessels in the working berths. The access route to the bridge to have a four metre channel available to allow tenders to route through the pontoon complex at all times. The bridge, to allow tenders to pass through, must not be less than three metres wide and not less than 1.5 metres high. The bridge to be lit within, to enable those using it to identify the location;

(iii) Hamble Yacht Services Limited to meet the cost of erecting and maintaining signs on the piles at the entrance to the tender channel warning of the bridge clearance available;

(iv) Hamble Yacht Services Limited to meet the cost of establishing and maintaining a solar powered navigation light on the downstream pontoon pile and also to paint the pile in high visibility red paint (initial painting to be carried out upon installation);

(v) Hamble Yacht Services Limited to meet the cost of establishing and maintaining two vertical fixed red navigation lights on the upstream outermost pile/pontoon and paint the pile with high visibility red paint (initial painting to be carried out upon installation) all within one week of installation;

(vi) The above conditions must all be met within one week of installation of the new pontoon structure;

(vii) At no time is Hamble Yacht Services Limited to allow double berthing to take place on the outside face of the proposed jetty head; and

(viii) All other appropriate consents being obtained.

9093Rpt/TC



RIVER HAMBLE HARBOUR AUTHORITY

PORT MARINE SAFETY CODE

RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

NAVIGATION CHANNEL

ADJACENT

HAMBLE YACHT SERVICES

AND

ALTERATIONS TO G PILES

26 July 2004

1. INTRODUCTION

The Government looks to all Harbour Authorities to implement the requirements of the Port Marine Safety Code (The Code). The Code is intended to apply to all Harbour Authorities to the extent that they have duties and powers relating to marine safety.

It is particularly directed at Harbour Authorities and to Directors, Commissioners or Trustees who are members of the boards of such Harbour Authorities. The Code is not optional it applies to ports of all sizes, irrespective of resources or levels of traffic.

The Code represents the national standard against which policies, procedures and performance of Harbour Authorities may be measured. It is obligatory for the purpose of meeting the standard in the Code that measures are taken to reduce all risks associated with port marine operations to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).

1. SCOPE

The Code does not apply to duties and powers other than those related to marine operations. Marine operations are those that facilitate the safe use of a harbours by vessels. They include the direction of shipping and the regulation of safety of navigation in a harbour and the maintenance of aids to navigation within the jurisdiction of a harbour.

2. RISK ASSESSMENT

The Code requires that each Harbour Authority assess risks associated with marine operations and manages those risks to reduce them to As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP). Risk assessment is an ongoing process to this end the Risk Assessment has been carried out by the Harbour Master to consider the risks associated with the proposed development at Stone Pier Yard.

3. DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this report the following definitions will apply:

A hazard is anything that can cause harm to a person, property or the environment;

A risk is the chance, high or low, that a person, property or the environment will be harmed by the hazard.

4. METHODOLOGY

To assess risks in The River Hamble 4 steps are followed:

1. Hazards are identified;

2. The consequence of the hazard materialised are assessed;

3. The risk and existing precautions are evaluated;

4. The findings are recorded.

It is also recognised that provision must be made to review and revise this assessment as necessary.

The aim of the Risk Assessment is to ensure that all of the significant hazards (potential accidents) associated with marine operations are identified and quantified in terms of risk to people, property and/or the environment.

This information provides an essential input to the continual development of The River Hamble Harbour Authority Safety Management System and will be used by the Harbour Authority as a rational basis on which to decide priorities and to set objectives for eliminating hazards and or reducing risks to As Low As Reasonably Practical.

The Risk Assessment identifies each hazard and then categorises them as either a collision, contact, grounding or a swamping hazard:

Collision:

Collision between two or more vessels which are underway, regardless of whether the vessel(s) are not under command or disabled in any way but excluding wrecks.

Contact:

A vessel striking, or being struck by, an external object or a vessel that is not underway (e.g. anchored or moored), excluding the sea bed.

Grounding:

A vessel coming to rest on, or riding across, underwater features or objects.

Swamping:

The excessive ingress of water over the gunwale of a vessel such that it becomes waterlogged and may sink.

An estimated degree of risk is assigned to each identified hazard to provide a relative rating between risks. The following scoring system has been applied:

LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE

CONSEQUENCE

Each hazard has been assigned a score of 1 to 5 for the "likelihood of occurrence" and a score of 1 to 5 for "consequence". The "risk rating" has then been obtained by multiplying the two scores together giving a maximum rating of 25. The higher the rating the more serious the potential consequences. Rating risks help to give an indication of their significance.

As a guide it is considered that any "risk rating" of 12 and above, is not ALARP and therefore additional precautions should be implemented to ensure compliance with the Code.

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF HAMBLE YACHT SERVICES

5. RESULT OF RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT

Of the 15 identified hazards 1 obtained risk ratings that would indicate that it would not at present be ALARP.

The following table lists precautions that would be introduced to manage the identified risks and therefore reducing the Highest Risk Rating to ALARP. These precautions reduce the risk to the figures denoted within the ( )

Precautions:

Control of entrance or departure to the river of all commercial craft. Commercial vessel deemed a danger will not be allowed entrance during periods of heavy volumes of traffic.

If necessary an escort will be given by the harbour patrol vessel.

The River Hamble Safety Management System will be amended to address these hazards so that identified risks will be managed to be as low as reasonably practical.

Full consideration will be given to the precautions identified above, reducing the Highest Risk Rating to below 12.

Precautions to be introduced:

(i) Harbour Authority to control the entrance or departure to the river of all commercial or large craft. Commercial and large vessel deemed a danger will not be allowed entrance during periods of heavy volumes of traffic. If necessary an escort will be given by the harbour patrol vessel.

(ii) Continue to educate those that use tenders and small dinghies to wear buoyancy aids or life jackets. To also carry torch and bailers etc.

(iii) To continue to make masters of larger vessels aware of the safety implications of travelling to fast and to ensure a good lookout is kept at all times by all masters and crews.

(iv) By using signage and other methods, attempt to make masters of vessels departing marinas reduce speed and to keep a good lookout for dinghies and small tenders.

6. CONCLUSION AND HARBOUR MASTER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Risk Assessment indicates that the proposed development will not result in the creation of any risks that are not considered to be As Low As Reasonably Practical and therefore all risks can be managed and reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical, this accords with the Port Marine Safety Code.

Having carefully considered this Risk Assessment the Harbour Master recommends that the proposed development at Hamble Yacht Services will not adversely effect navigational safety.

6.1 The Harbour Masters also makes the following recommendations and comments;

(i) Hamble Yacht Services to establish a solar powered navigation light on the down stream outer pile and also paint the pile with high visibility red paint.

(ii) Hamble Yacht Services to establish two vertical fixed red lights at the upstream outer pontoon and also paint the pile with high visibility red paint.

(iii) Hamble Yacht services to design the ends of the pontoons, and pile guides to be rounded and fixed with fendering.

(iv) The XOD fleet, in the main, is sailed by dedicated and experienced sailors who understand the risks and manage those risk successfully every week when sailing in the river. Even so, because the river is changing and the type of vessel and those that operate them are changing, a new mooring location should be investigated. Ideally any new location should afford the same shelter and give easy and direct access to the entrance of the river. Negotiations between the Crown Estates and the XOD fleet should be encouraged by the Harbour Authority.

(v) Even though the bridge is being supplied to allow tenders to transit the proposed new working berths within Hamble Yacht Services the Harbour Master would recommend the following:

(1) Those in small craft such as tenders would be recommended not to transit the river on the western side owing to the dangers of proceeding around the fuel berth and the seven blind exits from Port Hamble Marina. A small craft such as a tender with low freeboard will be difficult to see from a craft exiting the marina and would be liable for swamping or collision.

(2) Rowing boats would be safer to proceed on the eastern side of the river as this is deemed a safer route by the Harbour Master for the reasons given above and the tidal strength on the eastern side is weaker at this point of the river.

(3) The Harbour Master would recommend to all who use tenders to wear lifejackets and to carry aboard the recommended safety equipment for dinghies and tenders.

7. ONGOING RISK ASSESSMENTS

The assessments of risks is an ongoing process. This Risk Assessment will be regularly reviewed and updated and/or amended as appropriate. New risks that emerge as conditions or the use of the harbour change will be given immediate attention.

Risk assessment and the management of risks is a continual process.

AG Clatworthy

Harbour Master

26 October 2004

APPENDIX

Index to Points Raised by Deputations at the Executive Member's Decision Day on 9 November 2004
Concerning Navigational Safety

Point Raised	Reference within the report
1. Unacceptable narrowing of the fairway.	Paragraph 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5
2. The effective permanent reduction in the width of the River combined with the other effects to be identified will create an unacceptable position.	Paragraph 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5
3. A reduction of the main fairway by 43%.	Paragraph 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5
4. The berthing of large vessels would hamper the main channel.	The 45 metre gap allows sufficient room for vessels to manoeuvre into the berths upstream of the proposed development. Vessels would be able to come alongside the proposed outer berths easily. Paragraph 4.14, 4.15, 4.16
5. The 22 metre gap north of the proposed development presents an unacceptable risk.	The gap is 45 metres. Paragraph 3.3, 4.6 Paragraph 4.14, 4.15, 4.16
6. The gap between F4 and the southern end of the new pontoon is potentially hazardous.	Paragraph 3.3, 4.6
7. Vessels without engines will experience significant difficulties.	Paragraph 3.3
8. Vessel to the west of the G piles who do not use the exits downstream will have to navigate in shallower water.	This is no change from the current situation.
9. Vessels departing HYS will experience difficulties.	The 45 metre gap allows sufficient room for vessels to manoeuvre into the berths upstream of the proposed development. Vessels would be able to come alongside the proposed outer berths easily. Paragraph 4.14, 4.15, 4.16 .
10. Effect of tenders and small craft using the westerly passage.	Dinghies do not sail along narrow channels unless the wind happens to be in the right direction. Normally dinghies tack across all channels making use of the whole River.
11. Obstructed access the secondary channel for small craft and tenders.	Paragraph 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13
12. Lack of passing places within the proposed development for tenders.	Paragraph 4.11, 4.12
13. All small vessels above 1.5 metres will not be able to use the bridge.	1.5 metres head room is thought to be sufficient clearance for a small tender. Vessel with a beam of more than two metres might reasonably be expected to use the main channel in comparative safety.
14. Crossing the main channel twice on a journey upstream increases the risk.	The route through the RAFYC, RSYC past the fuel berth and the many entrances of Port Hamble is not recommended and is considered more dangerous than crossing the fairway. This is a decision that must be taken considering wind, tide and volume of traffic at the time of the journey.

Point Raised	Response
15. Serial 6 of the Risk Assessment deals with the risk of collision or swamping of tenders using the passage through the working berths, and the scoring is 2,1,1,1, giving a highest risk of only 2. Compare this with serial 8 in the Hamble Jetty to Port Hamble Risk Assessment where the scoring is 3,3,2,1 giving a higher risk rating of 9. It might be assumed that the risk rating should be similar.	15a. The two locations are dissimilar in many ways as the RSYC and RAFYC channels are more dangerous to tenders than the area in the proposed development. Tenders could meet RIBs and larger vessels coming head-on, club launches arriving and departing. And other small and large craft who's helms may not have sight of a small tender. The higher scoring was deliberate to envisage the dangers of proceeding through the RAFYC and RSYC passage. Risk assessments should not be quoted outside of other factors that impact on them.
16. Serial 8 of the HYS Risk Assessment received a scoring of 3,3,3,1 with a scoring of 9 this sounds very similar to serial 17 of the Stone Pier Yard Risk Assessment where the risk to sailing dinghies entering the main channel. In that assessment the scoring was 3,5,2,1 with a scoring of 15.	16a. Dinghies moving out into the main channel downstream of Stone Pier Yard must go directly out into the channel against the flow of traffic. They must negotiate vessels approaching or manoeuvring in and around the fuel jetty. The visibility is poor looking upstream because of the fuel jetty and its height. They must negotiate the fore and aft moorings on the edge of the main channel. For craft to join the main channel upstream of HYS they will be moving with the main flow of traffic. They will have a gap of 44 metres to merge into the main channel, which is an ample distance both for large sailing boats and XODs. Risk assessments should not be quoted outside of other factors that impact on them.
17. The Mooring Holders Association does not accept that it will be practical at all times to secure a number of conditions relating to the use of the proposed facility.	17a. The policing of the River is the responsibility of the Harbour Master and his staff.
18. Definition of a Working Berth.	18a. A Working Berth is used by a boatyard to berth vessels undergoing a refit, repairs or final completion of a build on the water. It will also be used for the berthing of vessel during trials. The boatyard is used mainly by visiting and local performance racing boats who undergo prolonged sea trials during fitting out of new equipment and rigging. The fitting out and maintenance of larger ocean going vessels is also undertaken.
19. The impact of the proposed development on the capacity of the River and the implications for the provisions of moorings including providing a range of moorings.	19a The provision of mooring types is not a matter for the Harbour Authority but a matter for those that own and provide them such as The Crown Estates, the Yacht Clubs and the commercial and marina operators. The Harbour Master has stated that the proposed development will not have a detrimental effect on the safety of navigation.
20. Mooring of vessels within the 16 metres width available will not leave sufficient room for tenders.	20a. The Harbour Master has set a limit of 4 metres to be left available for tenders to have access to the bridge designed for the use of tenders. On discussions with the yard owner a compromise in berthing vessels to enable those limits is easily achieved. The following dimensions are an example. A Swan 82 with a beam of 5.86 + fendering of .5 of a metre and Swan 56 with a beam of 4.73 metres with fendering of .5 metre leaves a channel of approximately 4.5 metres available for tenders.
21. The route for tenders will not allow a 3.5 or 4 metre beamed tender to proceed through the designated channel.	21a. The average beam of a small tender is 1¼ metres and the largest 1½ metres. A small boat with a beam of 2 metres or more would not be classed as a tender.
22. The Risk Assessment of the 14 September suggested that the proposed development should only be permitted to extend out 23 metres. Why has that danger disappeared.	22a. The introduction of a bridge in the proposed development allowing tenders to route through the development removed the danger of small tenders having to face oncoming vessels in the main fairway.
23. There are concerns that the XODs have not been consulted on the amended plan and other stakeholders have also indicated the lack of being informed.	23a The XOD fleet was represented at the initial consultation when all of their fears were recorded in detail. The Harbour Master visited the location on four Wednesday evenings and on one Saturday to observe the departure and sailing back onto the F pontoon by the XOD fleet. The Harbour Master, who has an understanding of the handling of this type of boat, is of the opinion that the proposed gaps of 44 metres downstream and 22 metres upstream, to allow the XODs to join the main channel or enter it, is safe and in some respects a better option that the current situation. See paragraph 3.3 of the background report and 6. (iv) of the Risk Assessment. The Harbour Master met with the Captain of the XOD fleet on Wednesday 24 November to discuss the new proposed plans and arrived at the following: (i) XODs moored on the F pontoon will have a very clear approach and departure route through the 45 and 22 metre gaps. (ii) XODs will have a limited view upstream when entering the main channel through the 45 metre gap at the downstream end of F pontoon. They will have a safety space of 22 metres in which to join and merge with the traffic flow. (iii) The upstream end of the F pontoon will be more accessible because the proposed pontoon has been moved to increase the gap available to 22 metres allowing boats to sail around the upstream end of F pontoon. This increased gap will also allow a better return approach to the F pontoon from the main channel. (iv) XODs moored on the eastern side of F pontoon may have difficulties in departing in low wind speeds with the tide on the ebb. This can be overcome by preparation and walking the boat around to a better departure point. This option may not be available owing to other boats. (v) XODs will be forced into the 60 metre main channel when returning to their mooring and will not have a direct approach to the F pontoon. They will also have to compete with the traffic flow. (vi) The XODs consider the proposed plans for HYS as on one hand introducing some new difficulties but at the same time providing safer and better conditions than those currently available. These considerations are dependant on the state of the tide, the wind direction and its strength. (vii) The risk of an incident may exist during very difficult conditions such as an ebb tide with little wind, when boats will have no steerage on. The conditions at the time and the decision to sail in those conditions is the responsibility of the skipper and is a decision which can be made by made by him alone. (viii) XODs do depart the moorings knowing that they may return on an unfavourable tide and in a reduced wind. The sailing and control of a 22 foot sailing keel boat that is not fitted with an engine can be challenging. Having to proceed for one mile through moorings and moving craft in the main fairway, sometimes in light winds, against the tide and wind, must be considered as a risk. Therefore the Harbour Master draws attention to the Harbour Masters comments in the Risk Assessment paragraph 6. (iv).
24. The Warsash (east side) of the River Hamble is more exposed to the prevailing wind, so in windy conditions, it is safer for small dinghies to proceed up and down river on the west side.	24a The Warsash Sailing Club members use the eastern side of the River to travel to their moorings. Others who launch their tenders at Warsash use the eastern side of the River. The oxers and other dinghies hold meetings and training takes place for juniors on the eastern side of the River every week. The route through the RAFYC, RSYC channels and then past the fuel berth and the many entrances of Port Hamble are more dangerous than crossing the fairway. This is a decision that must be taken considering wind, tide and volume of traffic at the time of the journey.

Index to Points Raised by Deputations at the Executive Member's Decision Day on 9 November 2004
Not Concerning Navigational Safety