Contact: Peter Robertson, Chief Executive 01962 847300

1. Introduction

1.1 In September 2005, the Home Secretary required all police authorities and forces to submit options for the improved delivery of `Protective Services' within a new organisation structure called a `Strategic Force'. Protective Services essentially concern counter terrorism, major crime investigations, serious organised crime and emergency resilience. The options considered had to include amalgamation with other Forces but could also include becoming a strategic force as a stand-alone force following some internal restructuring. Simply doing nothing was not an option available within the terms of the review unless protective services were already delivered well by a `strategic force'. The timetable for submissions was very demanding (effectively within 3 months of the announcement by the Home Secretary) and the methodology for self-assessment of options was laid down by Home Office guidance documents. The Home Office and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) have undertaken validation of the rationale behind the selection of preferred options.

1.2 The trigger for this work was the HMIC Dennis O'Connor report `Closing the Gap' on the capacity and capability of Police Forces to deliver the range of protective services to the standards defined by Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). The context for this report is the changed threat from counter terrorism, the lessons learned from Soham about major crime investigation and new research from the O'Connor report about the extent of serious and organised crime in non-metropolitan areas.

1.3 The O'Connor report findings were unequivocal; that smaller forces were less good at delivering protective services, that no forces except the largest metropolitans were delivering protective services to the required standard and that forces had to be a minimum size. His logic was to conclude there was a direct relationship between size and capacity to adequately deliver protective services. Whilst there are some professional concerns about the methodology and assumptions made in the O'Connor report, HMIC and the Home Secretary accepted the findings and the concept of Strategic Forces. The Home Office guidance sets a minimum size as either 4000 officers or 6000 staff. There is no set optimum or maximum size. It is worth noting that recent academic research commissioned by West Mercia Police Authority from the University of Warwick Business School and undertaken by Professor AJ Lawrance, Professor of Statistics, suggests there is no direct correlation between size and effectiveness in relation to such services.

1.4 Forces are required to demonstrate that they can deliver these protective services

effectively in the future without impacting on level 1 performance and neighbourhood policing. Level 1 performance relates to local policing. The objectives set by the Home Office include that the proposals should be acceptable to the wider public and reconciled (where possible) with key stakeholders own agendas. The Home Secretary has identified limited funding to facilitate change for those forces wishing to amalgamate voluntarily which the Association of Police Authorities (APA) has described as a bribe to describe change.

2. Protective Services Assessment

2.1 A project team was set up in Hampshire to self-assess the Force's capacity to deliver protective services (Stage 1 assessment). The outcome of this work was reported to the Police Authority along with early work on discounting options that did not seem to be feasible. The conclusion from the Stage 1 assessment was that Hampshire's delivery of protective services was better than the HMIC assessment and in many respects already met the national standard. The Authority agreed that 3 options (Hampshire, Hampshire/Dorset, and Hampshire/Dorset/Wiltshire) should be worked up during the second phase, subject to feedback from the Home Office central team who might require work on other options.

3. Progress during November

3.1 The business cases for mergers with any of the Forces identified steadily became less promising as detailed costs were calculated. The costs of mergers added to the high costs of improving the merged forces' protective services more than cancelled out the efficiency savings that could be realised by economies of scale. In essence Hampshire would be faced with diluting its existing high level of protective services to cover the merged force area while efficiency savings funded the amalgamation costs. The cost benefit of amalgamations would be realised years from the changes if at all, leaving protective services under resourced (compared to the national standard) during that time.

4. Consultation Arrangements

4.1 Stakeholders, local politicians, staff and the public have been engaged a number of times during October and November. An impressive portfolio of evidence has been gathered to demonstrate those views, which are overwhelmingly to invest in Hampshire as a stand-alone strategic force. Consultation methods included:

· On-line Questionnaire

· Independent Residents Focus Group Workshops

· Public Meetings of the Authority

· Briefing letters and information from the Chief Constable and Hampshire Police Authority Chairman

· Media coverage

· Campaigning by MPs

· Website

· Partnership questionnaire survey

· Presentations

4.2 In independently facilitated public consultation, residents felt frustrated and angered by Government's decision to overhaul the policing landscape in such a short time and many felt it was a political `knee-jerk reaction' to Soham and the events of 7 July. All groups recognised that there could be room for improvement but residents were adamant that amalgamating forces was not the best solution. Below are the main concerns they expressed:

· A remote structure and lack of local accountability

· The cost of change

· Loss of local knowledge if forces were too big

· Hampshire Constabulary's good performance would be impacted upon as other areas had to catch up

· Lack of mutual benefits

4.3 Residents felt that if they were forced to consider putting potential options for consideration into a list it would be Hampshire stand-alone; the next best option would be collaboration to the west, ie Dorset. They felt that `political geography' should play no part in the decision making process and were particularly vocal about not merging with forces to the east or north.

4.4 Council tax comparisons at Band D given mergers with surrounding forces are as follows:

Hampshire (stand alone): £113.76

Hampshire/Surrey: £154.26

Hampshire/Dorset: £142.11

Hampshire/Thames Valley: £126.28

5. Home Office submission

5.1 The Home Secretary's deadline for the submission of final business cases was 23 December although, following a meeting of the Association of Police Authorities (APA) on 7 December, it was agreed that no police authority would submit a final business case and preferred option until assurances had been received from the Government around governance and funding issues. In addition, the APA called for a full Parliamentary debate on the matter.

5.2 The Police Authority met on 15 December to consider the outcome of the work of the Project Team which confirmed earlier findings that Hampshire as a stand alone strategic force was the way ahead. Members supported the view of the Chief Constable that Hampshire had sufficient critical mass to provide both effective neighbourhood policing and sustainable protective services for the 21^st Century. The review had identified that a relatively small improvement in protective services was required to enable the Force to meet the national standard and stand alone as a strategic force, within existing boundaries, by April 2007. The investment required is £3.2m to which the Authority has agreed. Other merger options were discounted for strong professional and financial reasons as well as reflecting very clearly residents' and stakeholders' opposition to mergers and support for Hampshire as a strategic force. The standalone proposal ensures that all investment will be on policing improvements rather than squandering scarce resources on unnecessary structural change.

5.3 Both the Police Authority and the Chief Constable are proud of the history of investment and stewardship of the Constabulary that has produced performance that ranks Hampshire as one of the best in the country. The Authority is clear that the primary issue is to deliver enhanced protective services within a strategic force context. It is the Authority's settled view that its submission offers the very best way forward for the communities of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight.

5.4 On this basis, the Authority sent its case to the Home Secretary on 23 December and now looks forward to a decision, expected in February, that allows Hampshire Constabulary to continue delivering high quality policing to its communities in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the County Council supports the position of the Hampshire Police Authority in seeking to become a stand alone strategic force.

Section 100 D - Local Government Act 1972 - background papers

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